Morality and Free Will
Sven Gelbhaar
7/31/2017
In the book /Notes From The Underground,/ Fyodor Dostoevsky points out that with
systems of morality, the individual has a confined will; not the “free will”
that everyone is promised. The system dictates all of the individual/adherent’s
actions. All systems prohibit some actions and mandate others — therefore the
adherent does not have freedom of will, let alone action. So says Dostoyevski.
Freedom for moral agents comes into the equation as the agent aligns with
systems of morality that most appeal to him or her in situ, viz: in the moment.
By adopting Utilitarianism in this case, and Objectivism in that, et al., the
agent can transcend the dictates of any overarching moral system. Furthermore,
long term versus short term goals can add a degree of liberty; just as do
re-prioritizing virtues and goals.
There are a finite assortment of moral systems, so certain actions and goals can
never be mandated — for instance killing at random is not permitted under any
extant moral system. However, as infinite combinations of actions exist that
are condoned or encouraged under contemporary and classic morality, we have
infinite things we’re allowed to pursue and do. Ergo free will.