The kernel and chief point of my doctrine, its Metaphysic proper, is this, that what Kant opposed as thing-in-itself to mere appearance (called more
decidedly by me “representation”) and what he held to be absolutely unknowable,
that this thing-in-itself, I say, this substratum of all appearances, and
therefore of the whole of Nature, is nothing but what we know directly and
intimately and find within ourselves as will; that accordingly, this will, far
from being inseparable from, and even a mere result of, knowledge, differs
radically and entirely from, and is quite independent of, knowledge, which is
secondary and of later origin; and can consequently subsist and manifest itself
without knowledge: that this will, being the one and only thing-in-itself, the
sole truly real, primary, metaphysical thing in a world in which everything else
is only appearance, i.e., mere representation, gives all things, whatever they
may be, the power to exist and to act; … is absolutely identical with the will
we find within us and know as intimately as we can know any thing; that, on the
other hand, knowledge with its substratum, the intellect, is a merely secondary
phenomenon, differing completely from the will, only accompanying its higher
degrees of objectification and not essential to it; … that we are never able
therefore to infer absence of will from absence of knowledge.
— On the Will in Nature, Introduction
— https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Schopenhauer 14.05.2018
Our will, as Hegel contends, must necessarily have a physical goal in mind. Our
will then, can be said to be derivative of the external world (representation).
This will does not spring forth upon purely being (that is, without a body or
its inevitable hedonism), but rather develops later with what (as alluded to)
brings us pleasure or alleviates pain. The will is a subset of the external;
being caused by it. One could suppose that different people have a different
hierarchy of what they want (more pleasure here, less pain there), and this
could bring about (prime) different people to have different predilections and
therefore (allegedly innate) ethical character which Schopenhauer later talks
about. — Hegel and Schopenhauer, paraphrased
Will, like thought, needs an external reality. As I’ve said in the past,
without something to think about there would be no thought (ergo reality is
real, or at the very least external to the subject), so it is with Will too. I
can’t want something without a framework for it to exist in. In this way, we
don’t necessarily know the exact physical details of the object of our will, but
we know that it will alleviate something or sate some sort of unpleasant
annoyance. “I hate Mondays” is therefore a Will in that it is a reaction to
qualia, external situation(s) (physical framing), but nothing is specified that
would effect a solution to this suffering/Will. Please note that reality is
still presupposed, even for non-specific desires and goals. — Sven
Addendum (12.05.2019):
The will could be a general malaise, I suppose. A feeling of dissatisfaction
would be considered a (n impetus for) Will. This general discontentment, if
considered (a) will, would break the requirements conveyed above. That is to
say, it would be a free will in the colloquial as well as technical sense. No
specific desired outcome would be necessary. A feeling then, a remembered state
of satiation or other desired emotion, could in fact free the will from its
empirical restrictions.
Addendum (14.5.2019):
Having a general goal in mind, with no clear-cut (procedural) method of
attaining this in mind will also free the will. This logically follows from
the above, but flies in the face of my previous responce to Hegel. The reader
will hopefully forgive my earlier transgression.