Response to Hegel’s free will argument
Sven Gelbhaar
Hegel, in the first chapter of Philosophy of Right, claims that freedom is an
artificial construct and is therefore merely speculative. He then posits that
freedom as applied to the will, being speculative, is also true. He then
equivocates his definition of freedom and will with the colloquial definition
of free will.
The end, or goal, of will is concrete. Ergo not free, because free(dom) is a
concept. Therefore the will cannot be free. Resulting goal has to be something
concrete to be applied in objective reality. Since it is specific/concrete,
it is not abstract and therefore does not exhibit freedom, which is an
approximation or purely a mental construct.
Potential in itself cannot be realized in empirical reality. Every physical/
corporeal object has definite states, and thus potential cannot be manifested
in physical reality.
Therefore freedom, being unrestrained potential, cannot exist in the objective.
The individual has unlimited potential (action, etc) , in that there are
infinite numbers between one and two, but reality determines the content of
the will. Thus it can be considered free and (pre-ordered/) determined.
The desire is determined, but the potential solutions are infinite in scope,
and therefore free. Even if the will is set in stone, the potential response
by the subject are infinite.
Even if the subject has a rationality tapered scope, there are still an
infinite number of ways to react. It can mix and match various courses of
attaining its goals, such as ignoring it, etc
Or maybe the response is limited, in that we all die eventually. Willing
is an action, that like all actions are finite in time. Ponder this later.
If the will can will it’s timing of willing or acting in the will, then its
scope of response would be infinite. Analogy would be Geons.
Thus:
Time makes slaves of us all.